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Abstract
Cloud computing is appealing from management and
efficiency perspectives, but brings risks both known and
unknown. Well-known and hotly-debated information
security risks, due to software vulnerabilities, insider
attacks, and side-channels for example, may be only
the “tip of the iceberg.” As diverse, independently de-
veloped cloud services share ever more fluidly and ag-
gressively multiplexed hardware resource pools, unpre-
dictable interactions between load-balancing and other
reactive mechanisms could lead to dynamic instabili-
ties or “meltdowns.” Non-transparent layering struc-
tures, where alternative cloud services may appear in-
dependent but share deep, hidden resource dependen-
cies, may create unexpected and potentially catastrophic
failure correlations, reminiscent of financial industry
crashes. Finally, cloud computing exacerbates already-
difficult digital preservation challenges, because only
the provider of a cloud-based application or service can
archive a “live,” functional copy of a cloud artifact and
its data for long-term cultural preservation. This pa-
per explores these largely unrecognized risks, making
the case that we should study them before our socioeco-
nomic fabric becomes inextricably dependent on a con-
venient but potentially unstable computing model.
1 Introduction
Attractive features and industry momentum make cloud
computing appear destined to be the next dominant com-
puting paradigm. Cloud computing is appealing due to
the convenience of central management and the elastic-
ity of resource provisioning. Moving critical informa-
tion infrastructure to the cloud also presents risks, how-
ever, some of which are well-known and already hot
research topics. The much-discussed challenge of en-
suring the privacy of information hosted in the cloud,
for example [5], has resulted in an emerging breed of
“cloud-hardened” virtualization hardware [8] and secu-
rity kernels [23]. Similarly, the challenge of ensuring
high availability in the cloud has in part fueled recent
research on robust data center networking [14, 20].
This paper assumes that a large fraction of the com-
puting industry is, for better or worse, “moving to the
cloud,” and that current research addressing the immedi-
ate information security risks is well underway and will
(eventually) succeed. Setting aside these known chal-
lenges, therefore, this paper attempts to identify and fo-
cus on several less well-understood—and perhaps less
“imminent”—risks that may emerge from the shift to
cloud computing. In particular, this paper addresses: (1)
stability risks due to unpredictable interactions between
independently developed but interacting cloud computa-
tions; (2) availability risks due to non-transparent lay-
ering resulting in hidden failure correlations; and (3)
preservation risks due to the unavailability of a cloud
service’s essential code and data outside of the provider.
This paper is speculative and forward-looking; the au-
thor cannot yet offer definitive evidence that any of these
risks will fully materialize or become vitally important,
but rather can offer only informal arguments and anec-
dotal evidence that these risks might become important
issues. The above list is also probably incomplete: it is
likely that other important risks will emerge only as the
industry continues its shift to the cloud. Nevertheless,
I argue that it is worth proactively investigating longer-
term risks such as these before they are certain or im-
minent, as the stakes may be high. Further, once any
of these risks do become important, it may be too late
to reconsider or slow the movement of critical infras-
tructure to the cloud, or to rethink the architecture of
important cloud infrastructure or services once they are
already perceived as “mature” in the industry.
Section 2 addresses stability risks, Section 3 explores
availability risks, and Section 4 explores preservation
risks. Section 5 briefly points out a few possible re-
search directions in which solutions might be found—
though this paper cannot and does not pretend to offer
“answers.” Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Stability Risks from Interacting Services
Cloud services and applications increasingly build atop
one another in ever more complex ways, such as cloud-
based advertising or mapping services used as compo-
nents in other, higher-level cloud-based applications, all
of these building on computation and storage infrastruc-
ture offered by still other providers. Each of these in-
teracting, codependent services and infrastructure com-
ponents is often implemented, deployed, and maintained
independently by a single company that, for reasons of
competition, shares as few details as possible about the
internal operation of its services. The resource provi-
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Figure 1: Example instability risk from unintended cou-
pling of independently developed reactive controllers
sioning and moment-by-moment operation of each ser-
vice is often managed by dynamic, reactive control pro-
cesses that constantly monitor the behavior of customer
load, internal infrastructure, and other component ser-
vices, and implement complex proprietary policies to
optimize the provider’s cost-benefit ratio.
Each cloud service’s control loop may change the
service’s externally visible behavior, in policy-specific
ways, based on its neighboring services’ behavior, cre-
ating cyclic control dependencies between interacting
cloud services. These dependency cycles may lead to
unexpected feedback and instability, in much the way
that policy-based routing in BGP is already known to
lead to instability or “route flapping” in the much more
restricted “control domain” of Internet routing [6, 18].
To illustrate this risk, we consider a minimalistic, per-
haps contrived, but hopefully suggestive example in Fig-
ure 1. Application provider A develops and deploys a
cloud-based application, which runs on virtual compute
and storage nodes from infrastructure provider B. For
simplicity, assume A leases two virtual nodes from B,
and dynamically load-balances incoming requests across
the web/application servers running on these nodes. As-
sume A’s load balancer operates in a control loop with
a 1-minute period: after each minute it evaluates each
server’s current load based on that server’s response time
statistics during the past minute, and shifts more traffic
during the next minute to the less-loaded server. Assume
that A’s load shifting algorithm is well-designed and sta-
ble assuming the servers in the pool behave consistently
over time, like dedicated physical servers would.
Unbeknownst to A, however, suppose B also runs a
control loop, which attempts to optimize the power con-
sumption of its physical servers by dynamically adjust-
ing the servers’ clock rates based on load. This control
loop also happens to have a 1-minute period: after each
minute, B’s controller measures each CPU core’s uti-
lization during the past minute, then reduces the core’s
voltage and speed if the core was underutilized or in-
creases voltage and speed if the core was overutilized.
Again, assume that B’s controller is well-designed and
stable assuming that the servers’ load stays relatively
constant or varies independently of B’s control actions.
Although both A’s and B’s control loops would be
stable if operating alone, by the misfortune of their en-
gineers (independently) picking similar control loop pe-
riods, the combination of the two control loops may risk
a positive feedback loop. Suppose during one minute
the load is slightly imbalanced toward virtual server 1,
and the two control loops’ periods happen to be closely
aligned; this will happen sooner or later in the likely
event their clocks run at slightly different rates. A’s load
balancer notices this and shifts some load away from the
node in the next minute, while B’s power optimizer no-
tices the same thing and increases the node’s voltage and
clock speed. While either of these actions alone would
lead toward convergence, the two in combination cause
overcompensation: during the next minute, server 1 be-
comes more underutilized than it was overutilized in the
previous minute. The two controllers each compensate
with a stronger action—a larger shift of traffic back to
server 1 by A and a larger decrease in voltage and clock
speed by B—causing a larger swing the next minute.
Soon all incoming load is oscillating between the two
servers, cutting the system’s overall capacity in half—or
worse, if more than two servers are involved.
This simplistic example might be unlikely to occur in
exactly this form on real systems—or might be quickly
detected and “fixed” during development and testing—
but it suggests a general risk. When multiple cloud ser-
vices independently attempt to optimize their own oper-
ation using control loops that both monitor, and affect,
the behavior of upstream, downstream, or neighboring
cloud services, it is hard to predict the outcome: we
might well risk deploying a combination of control loops
that behaves well “almost all of the time,” until the emer-
gence of the rare, but fatal, cloud computing equivalent
of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge [3, 10].
Comparable forms of “emergent misbehavior” have
been observed in real computing systems outside of the
cloud context [11], and some work has studied the chal-
lenge of coordinating and stabilizing multiple interact-
ing control loops, such as in power management [13].
Current approaches to solving or heading off such insta-
bility risks, however, generally assume that some single
engineer or company has complete information about,
and control over, all the interacting layers and their con-
trol loops. The cloud business model undermines this
design assumption, by incentivizing providers not to
share with each other the details of their resource alloca-
tion and optimization algorithms—crucial parts of their
“secret sauce”—that would be necessary to analyze or
ensure the stability of the larger, composite system.
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Figure 2: Cloud service stack illustrating risks of corre-
lated failures due to hidden service interdependencies
3 Risks of Hidden Failure Correlations
Ensuring high availability is usually a high priority for
cloud infrastructure and services, and state replication
and fault tolerance mechanisms is the focus of much
industry and research attention. Most of this attention
is focused within a particular cloud service, however.
In addition to the stability risks discussed above, inter-
actions between multiple interdependent cloud services
could lead to availability risks not yet addressed in main-
stream research, where hardware infrastructure interde-
pendencies hidden by proprietary business relationships
can lead to unexpected failure correlations.
As another contrived but illustrative example, con-
sider the “cloud service stack” in Figure 2. The provider
at the top offers a cloud-based application intended to
offer mission-critical reliability. To ensure this reliabil-
ity, the application replicates all critical application state
across the storage services provided by two nominally-
independent cloud storage providers, A and B, each of
which in turn provides storage at multiple geographic
sites with separate network connectivity at each site.
Unbeknownst to the application provider, however,
each storage provider obtains its network connections
from a common underlying network provider, C. The
application’s access to its critical storage proves highly
reliable as long as provider C operates normally. If
provider C encounters a rare disaster or administrative
glitch, however—or enters a dispute with another top-
tier network provider [4]—the mission-critical applica-
tion may suddenly lose connectivity to both of its crit-
ical storage repositories. This correlated failure results
from the shared dependencies on C being hidden by the
proprietary business relationships through which the ap-
plication provider obtains services from A and B.
As the cloud computing industry matures and pro-
duces ever more complex cloud-based services, it seems
inevitable that the depth and complexity of inter-service
relationships will continue to explode, which may create
unpredictable availability risks due to ever more subtle
cross-layer interdependencies, of which the above ex-
ample is merely the most simplistic representative. Fur-
thermore, one of the fundamental attractions of cloud
computing is that it makes computing infrastructure, ser-
vices, and applications into generic, almost arbitrarily
“fungible” resources that can be bought, sold, and resold
as demanded by business objectives [21].
It does not seem far-fetched to predict that cloud ser-
vices will arise that represent a thin veneer over, or
“repackaging” of, other services or combinations of ser-
vices: e.g., businesses that resell, trade, or speculate on
complex cocktails or “derivatives” of more basic cloud
resources and services, much like the modern financial
and energy trading industries operate. If this prediction
bears out, the cloud services industry could similarly
start yielding speculative bubbles and occasional large-
scale failures, due to “overly leveraged” composite cloud
services whose complex interdependencies hide corre-
lated failure modes that do not become apparent until
the bubble bursts catastrophically—perhaps not wholly
unlike the causes of the recent financial meltdown or the
earlier Enron energy bubble [7]. Once again, while this
risk is pure speculation at this point, it seems worth tak-
ing seriously and exploring in advance.
4 Digital Preservation Risks
The final risk considered here is more long-term. With
the tremendous economic momentum toward cloud-
based and cloud-dependent applications and services,
it appears inevitable that these cloud-based “digital ar-
tifacts” will soon represent a considerable and ever-
increasing component of our social and cultural heritage.
In 100 years, however, will today’s culturally important
cloud-based digital artifacts still be available in a histor-
ically accurate form—or in any form?
A physical book has an inherent decentralized archiv-
ability property. In order to make money on a book, its
author or publisher must make complete copies available
to customers. Customers in turn are free to—and can-
not effectively be prevented from—independently stor-
ing books for any amount of time, relocating copies to a
safe long-term repository (e.g., a library), copying them
to other media as the original media deteriorates, etc.
Preservation of digital works presents many known
challenges—principally the faster deterioration or ob-
solescence of electronic media, and the obsolescence
of computing environments needed to interpret old data
formats [1, 9, 15]. Yet despite these known challenges,
traditional software and associated documents stored on
a floppy or hard disk, USB stick, or even a “cloud drive”
holding raw files, still has the same decentralized archiv-
ability property of a book. The vendor of a traditional
software application or digital document must, in or-
der to make money, make essentially complete copies
available to customers, and these customers can work in
an arbitrarily decentralized fashion using their own re-
sources to preserve digital works deemed worth saving.
Cloud-based applications and services, however,
completely eliminate this property of decentralized
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archivability. Unlike users of Microsoft Office, users
of Google Search or Maps never gain access to any-
thing remotely resembling a “complete copy” of the en-
tire digital artifact represented by the Google Search or
Maps service. At most, users might save the results
of particular queries or interactions. Unlike players of
Doom, players of World of Warcraft (WoW) cannot in-
dependently archive and preserve a copy of the WoW
universe—or even a small portion of interest—because
the provider of the cloud-based application need not, and
typically does not, make publicly available the server-
side software and data comprising the service.
Given the number of scholarly papers written on the
technological and social implications of each, it would
be hard to argue that Google Search and WoW do not
represent a historically significant digital artifacts. Yet
given the rate that Google and Blizzard evolve their
services to compete more effectively in the search and
gaming markets, respectively, it is almost certain that
ten years from now, no one outside these companies—
perhaps not even anyone inside them—will be able to
reproduce a faithful, functioning copy of the Google
Search or WoW service as it exists today. In 100 years,
these services will probably have evolved beyond recog-
nition, assuming they survive at all.
If today’s digital archivists do their jobs well, in 100
years we will be able to run today’s Microsoft Word or
play Doom (in an emulator if necessary)—but nothing
today’s digital archivists can do will preserve histori-
cally relevant snapshots of today’s cloud-based services,
because the archivists never even get access to a “com-
plete” snapshot for preservation.
The historical record of today’s Google Search or
WoW will consist merely of second-hand accounts: ar-
ticles written about them, saved search queries or screen
shots, captured videos of particular WoW games, etc.
While better than nothing, such second-hand accounts
would not suffice for future historians to answer ques-
tions such as: “How did the focus or breadth of search
results for interesting queries evolve over the last 10 or
100 years?” Or, “How did social-interaction and player-
reward mechanisms change in MMOGs historically?”
These particular examples may or may not seem inter-
esting or important, but the point is that we don’t know
what future historians or social scientists will deem im-
portant about today’s world. As more of today’s cul-
ture shifts to the cloud, our failure to preserve our cloud-
based digital artifacts could produce a “digital dark age”
far more opaque and impenetrable to future generations
than what media or OS obsolescence alone will produce.
5 In Search of Possible Solutions
This paper cannot hope to—and makes no attempt to—
offer solutions or answers to the problems outlined
above. Instead, we merely conjecture at a few potential
directions in which solutions might be found.
Stabilizing Cloud Services: One place we might be-
gin to study stability issues between interacting cloud
services, and potential solutions, is the extensive body of
work on the unexpected inter-AS (Autonomous System)
interactions frequently observed in BGP routing [6, 18].
In particular, the “dependency wheel” model, useful for
reasoning about BGP policy loops, seems likely to gen-
eralize to higher-level control loops in the cloud, such
as load balancing policies. Most of the potential solu-
tions explored so far in the BGP space, however, appear
largely specific to BGP—or at least to routing—and may
have to be rethought “fram scratch” in the context of
more general, higher-level cloud services.
Beyond BGP, classic control theory may offer a
broader source of inspiration for methods of understand-
ing and ensuring cloud stability. Most conventional
control-theoretic techniques, however, are unfortunately
constructed from the assumption that some “master sys-
tem architect” can control or at least describe all the
potentially-interacting control loops in a system to be
engineered. The cloud computing model violates this
assumption at the outset by juxtaposing many interde-
pendent, reactive control mechanisms that are by nature
independently developed, and are often the proprietary
and closely-guarded business secrets of each provider.
Deep Resource (In)Dependence Analysis: The avail-
ability risks discussed in Section 3 result from the fact
that cloud service and infrastructure providers usually
do not reveal the deep dependency structure underly-
ing their services. The key to this risk is the non-
transparency of the dependency graph: the application
provider in Figure 2 does not know that both A and B de-
pend on the same network provider C, resulting in hid-
den failure correlations. Supposing the providers were
to make these dependencies visible in an explicit depen-
dency graph, however, we might be able to estimate ac-
tual dependence or independence between different ser-
vices or resources for reliability analysis.
Hardware design techniques such as fault tree analy-
sis [2, 19] may offer some tools that could be adapted
to the purpose of reasoning about cloud service and in-
frastructure dependencies. Consider for example a sim-
plistic AND/OR resource dependency graph, shown in
Figure 3. AND nodes reflect design composition and
hence conjunctive dependency: all components under-
neath an AND node must function correctly in order for
the component above to operate. OR nodes reflect de-
sign redundancy and hence disjunctive dependency: if
any component underneath the OR node operates, the
dependent component above the OR will operate. Given
such a graph, annotated with expected failure rates, one
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Figure 3: AND/OR Graph Representing Service Composition and Infrastructure Dependencies
might compute or estimate a system’s effective reliabil-
ity after accounting for unanticipated common depen-
dencies, such as Network Provider C in the example.
Cloud providers may be reluctant to release detailed
dependency information publicly for business reasons,
but might willing release it to a trusted third party, such
as an organization analogous to Underwriters Labora-
tories (UL) offering cloud reliability analysis services.
More ambitiously, cloud providers might leverage TPM-
attested, IFC-enforcing kernels [22] to exchange and an-
alyze dependency graph information, without allowing
proprietary information to “leak” beyond this analysis.
Preserving Cloud Artifacts: Enabling the long-term
preservation of cloud artifacts will require solving both
incentive problems and technical challenges.
In a cloud-based computing model, application and
service providers currently need not, and have little in-
centive to, make publicly available all the software and
data underlying the service that would be necessary for
accurate historical preservation. Competition encour-
ages providers to closely guard the “secret sauce” un-
derlying their products. This incentive has long led tra-
ditional software vendors to release their software only
in binary form—often with deliberate obfuscation to
thwart analysis—but only the cloud model frees the ven-
dor entirely from the need to release their code in any
form directly executable by the customer. Solving this
incentive problem will likely require social, commercial,
and/or governmental incentives for providers to make
their cloud-based artifacts preservable in some way.
On the technical side, cloud-based services often rely
on enormous, frequently-changing datasets, such as the
massive distributed databases underlying Google Search
or Maps or an MMOG’s virtual world. Even if will-
ing, it might be impractically costly for providers to
ship regular snapshots of their entire datasets to digi-
tal archivists—even well-provisioned ones such as the
Library of Congress—not to mention costly for receiv-
ing archivists to do anything with such enormous snap-
shots beyond saving the raw bits. A more practical ap-
proach may be for providers themselves to be respon-
sible for saving historical snapshots in the short term,
using standard copy-on-write cloning and deduplicated
storage technologies for efficiency [12, 16]. After some
time period, say 5–10 years, a select subset of these his-
torical snapshots might then be transferred to external
archives for long-term preservation, at considerably re-
duced cost-per-bit in terms of both network bandwidth
and storage due to intervening technological evolution.
Any solution would need to address many other chal-
lenges, such as ensuring the durability and integrity
of online digital archives [9] and the honesty of their
providers [17], maintaining information security of sen-
sitive data in snapshots of cloud-based artifacts, and pre-
serving artifacts’ practical usability in addition to their
raw bits, but we leave these issues to future work.
6 Conclusion
While the cloud computing model is promising and at-
tractive in many ways, the author hopes that this paper
has made the case that the model may bring risks beyond
obvious information security concerns. At the very least,
it would be prudent for us to study some of these risks
before our socioeconomic system becomes completely
and irreversibly dependent on a computing model whose
foundations may still be incompletely understood.
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